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Abstract 
An increasing wealth of experimental detail is becoming available about the 
development and nature of addiction. Critical issues such as the varying 
vulnerabilities of individuals who develop addiction are being illuminated across 
levels of phenomenological, psychological and neurobiological detail. Furthermore, 
a rich theoretical understanding is emerging in the field of neural reinforcement 
learning, with glimmers as to how this might be related to the subjective experience 
of those individuals affected. In this chapter, we consider some particuarly  
pressing current issues in the interface between experiment and theory, notably the 
so-called “compulsive” phase of drug taking.  
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Introduction 
The development of addiction is characterized by several key features (Beck et al., 2011; Gelder et al., 
2006; Heinz et al., 2009a; Koob, 2003; DSM IV-TR (American Psychiatric Association, 1994); ICD-10 
(World Health Organization, 1990)). These include an evolving tolerance to the effects of the drug of 
abuse, which is accompanied by adaptations in central neurotransmission. Strikingly, tolerance does not 
decrease, but rather seems to coincide with an increase in the lure of drugs. Once established, addictions 
are accompanied by the subjective experience of intense cravings for the drug and by elaborate drug 
seeking behaviors. By comparison with drugs, normal reinforcers lose the ability to control behavior: 
people with substance dependencies continue to take drugs despite apparently understanding and 
acknowledging the devastating effect this may have on their life and despite expressed desires and 
frequent attempts to abstain. Indeed, “wanting” and “liking” the drug appear to be separable phenomena: 
addicts may want drugs even when they no longer expect or experience positive hedonic effects 
(Robinson and Berridge, 2003). Thus, the objective behavior and the subjective experience of addictive 
disorders evidence a certain disconnect. Though largely preclinical, recent studies have resulted in an 
increasingly detailed description of how initially harmless drug-taking for hedonic reasons is transformed 
into a maladaptive and “compulsive” pattern of “wanting” to take drugs that is resistant to negative 
outcomes (Vanderschuren and Everitt, 2004; Everitt and Robbins, 2005). Finally, a key feature of 
addiction is the tendency for relapse years or decades into abstinence. This chapter will describe how 
models of decision-making can be used to bridge the gap between neurobiological mechanisms, behavior 
and possibly even individual subjective experience.  
The main accounts of decision making come from the evolving field of neural reinforcement learning 
(Sutton and Barto, 1998), which links computational notions of optimal control (Puterman, 2005) and 
psychological data on conditioning (Sutton and Barto, 1990), together with their neural substrate in the 
striatum and the latter’s associated neuromodulatory, amygdala and cortical inputs (Niv, 2009; Daw and 
Doya, 2006). There is now extensive evidence that addictive substances modulate and derail adaptive 
decision-making in part by influencing the function of dopamine. For instance, drugs of abuse share a 
prominent ability to release dopamine (Koob, 1992), and electrical as well as optogenetic stimulation of 
dopamine release can lead to behavior that shares important characteristics with addictions (Olds, 1956; 
Tsai et al., 2009; though see Garris et al., 1999). Furthermore, as we review below, imaging has shown 
that there are abnormalities in dopamine D2 receptors in humans (Heinz et al., 1996; Volkow et al., 1996) 
of a sort that various animal models show can contribute to addictive behaviors (Thanos et al., 2001; 
Morgan et al., 2002; Johnson and Kenny, 2010; Bello et al., 2011). The stages of drug addiction, from 
early in the addiction up through “compulsive” drug taking and to relapse, provide clues but also 
complications for neural accounts of reinforcement learning. Most explanations of the onset of drug 
consumption are straightforward, with drugs acting as strong surrogate rewards (Redish, 2004). However, 
what poses greater challenges (Redish et al., 2008; Dayan 2009) is the development of deeply ingrained, 
recidivist states and the involvement of dopamine therein.  
In this chapter, we focus on the so-called “compulsive” nature of drug taking, i.e. the seeking and taking 
of drugs despite severely aversive consequences. We discuss recent conceptions of the interaction of 
different instrumental and Pavlovian learning systems, and the way that dopamine manipulations 
occasioned by drugs may affect both. These issues are certainly not settled – there are, for instance, 
debates concerning the migration of control from the ventral to dorsal striatum (Everitt et al., 2008) 
versus enhanced incentive salience of drug-associated cues (Robinson and Berridge, 2001, 2003) that 
have yet to be fully resolved.  
At the outset, it is important to clarify the use of the word “compulsion” especially as it applies to the 
subjective experience of the patient. The clinical description of compulsions in the setting of obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) denotes behaviors whose aims are to reduce negative affect associated with 
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aversive obsessive thoughts (See chapter by Denys, Prosée and Stein, this volume). That is, in OCD, 
compulsions denote behaviors aimed at terminating or reducing aversive states. In addiction research, 
“compulsive” is used rather to denote behaviors persisting despite their aversive consequences (Robbins 
and Everitt, 2005; Robbins et al., 2012). They do not refer to behaviors that might be driven by aversive 
withdrawal states (Koob, 2003). These two different compulsions likely have very different neural 
counterparts, with OCD, for instance, being associated with increased - but drug addiction with decreased 
- frontal cortical resting state activation (Baxter et al., 1988; Heinz, 1999; Saxena et al., 1998; Volkow et 
al., 1993; 2011). What both descriptions do however capture is the profoundly compelling force to act. 
We will leave the similarity of compulsions in addiction and OCD for further consideration elsewhere. 
Here, we focus on the notion of compulsions in addiction because they are key to the development of 
learning-theoretic models of addiction, and because they provide one possible avenue for “wanting” and 
seeking drugs despite not “liking” them, that is for the disconnect between subjective experience and 
observable behavior.  
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Reinforcement learning 
Reinforcement learning (RL) comprises a set of approaches to adaptive optimal control. These allow 
natural and artificial agents alike to learn to choose actions that maximize their rewards and minimize 
their punishments (Sutton and Barto, 1998). RL’s closest psychological counterpart is thus instrumental 
conditioning (Mackintosh, 1983).  
 
Figure 1: Model-based and model-free choices. A: Decision trees. Imagine having to navigate 
a maze. If one knew the layout of the maze, and knew which outcome was at the bottom of 
each path, one could consider all sequences of left-right choices to decide on the best one. For 
this maze, one would have to consider four sequences, each containing two choices. More 
generally, the tree could be much deeper, and there could be more options to choose from at 
each choice-point. In chess, for instance, the tree would not have 4, but on the order of 3040 
branches. B: In outcome devaluation, rats first learn to press a lever to obtain a reward 
(green bar). The reward is then devalued, for instance through satiation or through 
association with illness. Rats are then given the option to press the lever again. If rats have 
been trained only a little, the rate at which they press the lever will be greatly reduced (dark 
blue bar). Responding is said to be goal-directed, here driven by the desirability of the 
outcome obtained by the action. If, on the other hand, the rats have been pressing the lever for 
a long time, they will not show a suppression of lever pressing, but continue pressing the lever 
for an outcome they no longer desire. Responding is now said to be habitual, and insensitive 
to the desirability of the outcome resulting from the action. Accruing experience thus results 
in a shift from an early, goal-directed, to a later, habitual phase.  
RL focuses on the fact that most decision problems have longer-term, as well as immediate, 
consequences, and the benefits and costs of all of these have to be taken into account. This is difficult 
because the number of trajectories of future states and choices typically grows exponentially with the 
horizon. Consider chess: to deduce, purely from a knowledge of the rules, the best possible move, 
requires consideration of the future. If the player faces a choice of 30 possibilities at each move, then 
looking just two moves ahead requires consideration of 30 x 30 = 900 different combinations. Deducing 
the optimal move demands looking ahead all the way to the end of the game. If an average game is 
around 40 moves long, then around 3040 sequences have to be evaluated.  
In so-called model-based decision-making, agents are assumed to have, or to be learning, a full 
description of an environment. Then, they explicitly consider all consequences of all future actions 
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starting from a state or location in the world, and use this to deduce which sequence of choices would be 
optimal. Figure 1a shows an example. In chess, a model-based strategy would correspond to knowing the 
rules and the aim of the game, and deducing from this alone the best possible action choice. Actions are 
thus taken with the explicit aim of achieving a particular outcome, given the known consequences of 
choices. This makes model-based RL exhibit the signature characteristic of goal-directed actions, namely 
instant sensitivity to changes in outcome values (green and dark blue bars in Figure 1b; Dickinson and 
Balleine, 2002; Daw et al., 2005; Dickinson, 1985; Valentin et al., 2007; de Wit et al., 2009; Tricomi 
et al., 2009). However, although model-based approaches are often guaranteed to produce good 
outcomes, they are typically rendered useless by their intensive computational demands, and thus cannot 
simply be solved by the model-based system. Indeed, animals and humans can be shown to employ 
model-based choice strategies, but only in rather small environments (Shallice, 1982; Simon and Daw, 
2011, Huys et al. 2012). 
At the other end of the spectrum of computational requirements lie model-free techniques. Put simply, 
these methods lead to repetition of what was rewarded in the past. To return to the chess example, 
experience of  games in the past might teach the player that moves which result in the loss of the most 
powerful figure, the queen, are most likely to be deleterious, and should not be considered further. Model-
free methods learn from past experience by maintaining a running average – a cache – of past rewards 
and punishments of each move at each state. They can adopt a particular manoeuvre called temporal 
difference learning (Sutton 1988) to do the updating and averaging efficiently. Indeed, given the 
assumption that the environment is fixed, particular ways of averaging over experiences can solve the 
hard problem of considering the future consequences of each action (Sutton and Barto, 1998). Consider 
again Figure 1a: In the absence of explicit knowledge about the maze, one could repeatedly walk through 
it, and, on each trial, iteratively update the estimate of the long-term outcomes of taking a left or right turn 
at each state. This would lead to an average estimate - through repeated experience - of the outcomes. 
Clearly, this would shift the onus from thinking through all possible outcomes to experiencing them 
multiple times.  
 
Figure 2: Temporal prediction error account of classical conditioning. A: A conditioned 
stimulus (CS) temporally precedes and predicts presentation of an unconditioned stimulus (a 
cheese reward delivered in a goal box for a mouse). B: Temporal prediction errors. During 
early trials, a prediction error arises at the time of the US (red line towards the right). As 
learning proceeds, this error signal moves towards the time of the CS onset (red line on the 
left). Critically, this shift of the prediction error signal is thus reflected, over trials, by a decay 
of the error signal at the time of the US and an increase at the time of the CS (green lines). C: 
Time course of the cached expectations Vt over time. Initially, there is no expectation (flat red 
line to the right). After learning, the reward expectation rises on presentation of the CS and 
remains high until the US is received.  
Temporal difference learning computes, on each trial t, the difference δt between the outcome rt and the 
expectation Qt(action,state) for the choice at that state, and then uses this difference to update the 
expectation. Given these cached state-action Q values, choice is straightforward: simply choose the action 
that in the past yielded the best outcomes, i.e., the one with the largest Q value in that state. Since it is not 
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necessary to build or search a tree of future possibilities, these methods are computationally cheap. 
Indeed, further phases of model-free caching are also possible – towards storing the minimal information 
required, namely which action to take at each state (which then obviates the need to compare actions 
according to their values). In RL, such minimal models are called actors.  
Model-free techniques replace the computational demands of model-based techniques with a demand for 
extensive experience. Critically therefore, because choices are based on long-term average returns, they 
are not sensitive to sudden changes in the values of outcomes, and so have been compared to habits (Daw 
et al., 2005). In Figure 1b, we see that after extensive experience, animals continue to press a lever for an 
outcome they no longer desire. In model-free accounts of choices, this is because choices are based on 
their past successes, not on whether they will now lead to the desired outcome. Thus, as experience 
accrues, organisms gradually shift control from goal-directed towards habitual choice, which is no longer 
directly driven by the immediate outcome (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; Tricomi et al., 2009). 
Normative accounts argue that this shift occurs as the inaccuracies associated with the taxing 
computations of model-based control outweigh the inaccuracies associated with the statistical inefficiency 
of model-free control. It has been found, however, that both controllers are functional (Coutureau and 
Killcross, 2003; Smith et al., 2012) simultaneously, and various more complex interactions are being 
examined (Daw et al., 2011; Huys et al. 2012; Dayan 2012).  
One important interaction is strongly predicted on theoretical grounds, but has yet to be observed in the 
wild. This is that cached values should be used to substitute for the values of whole branches of the goal-
directed search tree, when that tree gets too big to evaluate directly. This is common in technical 
applications, underlying, for instance, the operation of Deep Blue, the first computer to beat a reigning 
chess world champion (Campbell et al., 2002). We will return to this in the section on conditioned 
reinforcement. Amongst other facets, it provides a means for comparatively inflexible habits to distort the 
flexible goal-directed system, and hence for the staggering contrast between the fixed desire for drugs, but 
the broadly adaptive strategies addicts characteristically engage in to obtain those drugs. 
Instead of updating the expectation of state-action combinations, state expectations V(state) alone can 
also be maintained. These state expectations, which could also be produced by a model-based calculation, 
have been treated in Pavlovian terms, representing predictions about future prospects in an action 
independent manner. Such Pavlovian conditioning is evident in conditioned responses, namely actions 
elicited in states that predict affectively important outcomes, but whose form seems to be predetermined. 
States with positive values, i.e. that lead to reward, may elicit approach and engagement. States that lead 
to punishments evoke inhibition and withdrawal (McClure et al. 2003). The detailed nature of the 
responses evoked by valued states are thought to be evolutionarily pre-programmed and can be 
surprisingly fine-grained, particularly for the case of aversion (Bolles, 1970). However, because they are 
evolutionarily engrained, only certain state-action mappings can be implemented by the Pavlovian system 
(in contrast with the instrumental system, where any state-action combination can theoretically be 
reinforced). This, combined with the cached nature of state values, explains one signature feature, which 
is that they are emitted when a certain stimulus elicits them irrespective of the actual consequence. For 
instance, pigeons peck a light predictive of food (hence having high state value V), even though food is 
omitted whenever they peck the light (Williams and Williams (1969); Hershberger (1986); Breland and 
Breland (1961); Dayan et al. (2006)).  
Electrophysiological recordings from midbrain dopamine neurons have shown that their phasic responses 
are commensurate with a temporal version of just the sort of prediction error δt (obtained minus expected 
reward) necessary for incremental model-free learning in the face of rewards. Figure 2 shows the 
evolution of the value signal and the prediction errors δt for a simple Pavlovian task in which a light 
predicts a reward (see Montague et al., 1996; Schultz et al., 1997). These prediction errors allow the 
iterative, gradual and model-free learning of state values V in Pavlovian conditioning (Montague et al., 
1996; Schultz et al., 1997; Bayer and Glimcher, 2005), and of state-action values Q in instrumental 
conditioning (Schultz et al., 1997; Morris et al., 2006; Roesch et al., 2007) by simply accumulating them 
over time. It has been observed that the connections between the striatum and dopamine nuclei form a 
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spiral, running from ventromedial to dorsolateral striatum in consort with VTA to SNc (Haber et al., 
2000; Joel and Weiner, 2000). This spiral has been suggested as being consistent with the progressive 
realization of the minimal form of model-free (habitual) control (i.e., an actor), in the most dorsal regions 
of the striatum (Haruno and Kawato, 2006).  
Summary box 1: Phasic dopamine signals are thought to support the acquisition of model-
free reward expectations and to drive habitual decision making. Model-based expectations 
underlie goal-directed choices. In Pavlovian paradigms, state or stimulus-evoked 
expectations themselves have a direct influence on behavior.  
Clinical vignette: A patient presented to Accident & Emergency with signs of alcohol 
withdrawal. Inquiries with other local hospitals and the community mental health team 
revealed that he had presented to A&E with similar symptoms three times. Every of these 
times, he had undergone detoxification as an inpatient, in that the potentially severe side 
effects of sudden cessation of alcohol drinking had been managed with a tapered course of 
benzodiazepines. Moreover, each time he received detailed counselling about alcohol 
cessation and had expressed strong wishes to remain alcohol free. This was in part to save 
his job as a staff nurse and his marriage. On this, his fourth, admission, however, he lost his 
job and his wife had left him. On questioning, he explained how his relapses had always 
taken place after returning to his usual drinking places. He tried to avoid them. However,  
when he was tired or otherwise preoccupied, he would find himself habitually taking the 
turns leading him back to his favourite pub. Although manageable from afar, once close, he 
found the temptation to drink much more difficult to resist. Once he had resumed drink, he 
then found himself unable to stop. Each drink lead to the next, as if cueuing it, eventually 
culminating in the next admission to the hospital.  
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Towards “compulsions” in addiction 
The power of some drugs of addiction to release dopamine directly (e.g. Aragona et al. 2008) allows them 
to act in place of natural appetitive reinforcers, directly boosting actions leading to the drugs (Phillips et 
al. 2003; Redish, 2004; Redish et al., 2008; though see also Self and Nestler, 1995). That is, without 
altering the function or structure of reward signaling or learning per se, drugs can usurp the learning 
structures by virtue of their impact on dopamine. In itself, this may lead to very strong behaviors and 
likely plays an important role both in the initial phases of drug taking and in the maintenance. 
Nevertheless, in a subset of the population, drug taking takes on a nature that appears to be more 
“compulsive” than merely habitual in that it becomes immune to aversive consequences. This is mirrored 
by findings in the animal literature where extensive experience with lever pressing for an addictive 
substance leads to responding that persists when shocks are superimposed (Vanderschuren and Everitt, 
2004), but only in a subpopulation of subjects (Deroche-Gamonet et al., 2004). The mechanisms that 
differentiate habitual drug taking and facilitate their malignant transformation into more compulsive 
forms are the object of current research. We here review three important factors: first, adaptations in the 
dopaminergic system; second, adaptations in the striatal embedding of state-action contingencies; and 
third, Pavlovian state valuation processes (see also Huys et al., 2013).   
Neuroadaptations of D2 receptors 
Drugs of abuse, particularly amphetamines, persistently modify the dopaminergic system, potentially 
increasing the amount of dopamine released over and above the physiological levels (Beck et al. 2011, Di 
Chiara and Bassareo, 2007; Heinz et al., 2009a). This is supported by a prominent collection of findings 
concerning the role of D2 receptors in addiction. PET imaging in humans addicted to a variety of 
substances has shown reductions in striatal D2 receptors (Heinz et al., 1996, 2009b; Volkow et al., 2009). 
There are parallel findings in animal models even in obesity (Johnson and Kenny, 2010). Reductions in 
D2 receptor densities in humans may even predispose to the development of addictive behavior (Volkow 
et al., 2009; Morgan et al., 2002), and a causal role of such D2 reductions for excessive drug intake been 
demonstrated causally in animal experiments (Thanos et al., 2001). In humans, the reduction correlates 
with subjective reports of craving (Heinz et al., 2004; Figure 3), likely increases the risk of relapse (Heinz 
et al., 2005b), and modulates the euphoria experienced by amphetamine administration (Volkow et al., 
2002b). In the human midbrain, it correlated with increases in impulsivity (Buckholtz et al., 2010). 
Indeed, allelic variation in genes thought to affect the D2 receptor point in the same direction (Comings et 
al., 1996; Frank et al., 2007).  
One important limitation of PET studies is that they have had difficulty dissociating pre- and post-
synaptic contributions of D2 receptors. D2 receptors have a high affinity for dopamine (Richfield et al., 
1989). They are therefore substantially occupied even at tonic background levels of dopamine (up to 
70%; Abi-Dargham et al., 2000; Laruelle et al., 1997; Dreyer et al., 2010).  Since they are inhibitory 
(Nicola et al., 2000), those D2 receptors located presynaptically might thus have a role in modulating 
phasic transients, i.e. in a negative feedback loop reducing phasic dopamine transients in response to tonic 
dopamine levels (Grace, 1991; Floresco et al., 2003; Goto et al. 2005; Niv et al., 2007; Schlagenhauf et 
al., 2012;). Changes in presynaptic D2 receptors could contribute to an increase in phasic dopamine 
signals in at least two ways. First, a reduction in D2 receptors would reduce the negative feedback, and 
would also weaken the connection between tonic and phasic signals (Lorenz, Schlagenhauf, Huys, Heinz, 
unpublished observations).  Indeed, mice genetically modified to lack presynaptic D2 receptors (but not 
differing in tonic dopamine levels) show an increase in phasic dopamine release (Bello et| al. 2011).  
Second, in the context of addiction, PET studies have also suggested a chronic reduction in released and 
stored dopamine (immediately post detoxification; Martinez et al., 2005; Heinz et al., 2005b; Volkow et| 
al. 1997, 2002a, 2007). If the indirect effect of reducing inhibition because the D2 receptors will 
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experience reduced tonic dopamine levels outweighs the direct impact of the lessened release, this could 
also boost net phasic signals. 
 
Figure 3: Craving and D2 receptor availability in detoxified alcohol-dependent patients. The 
upper left image that D2 receptor availability correlates with alcohol craving in the bilateral 
ventral striatum. The upper right image superimposes standardized anatomic brain regions. 
The scatterplot at the bottom shows the correlation between D2 binding potential in the right 
ventral striatum and the alcohol craving score. Adapted from Heinz et al. 2004, permission 
pending. See original publication for further details.  
Alterations of the generation and regulation of the phasic dopamine signal itself provide a direct pathway 
by which drugs of addiction might persistently modify the kinds of model-free learning signals (the 
prediction error δt) that dopamine is thought to report. The question is precisely how, as subtly different 
modifications make profoundly different predictions (Redish 2004; Dayan 2009), and some obvious 
modifications do not result in overly resistant behaviour. For instance, if the changes simply resulted in a 
multiplication of the prediction error signal, this would effectively lead to a change in the learning rate 
and predict faster learning, but the resulting behavior would have no more weight than other behaviors. A 
simple multiplicative increase in the phasic signal would not only fail to explain the persistence of drug 
taking against aversive consequences (as it would predict straightforward un-learning), but it additionally 
would fail to predict its dominance over other appetitively motivated behaviors. “Compulsive” behaviors 
could, however, emerge if the phasic dopamine signal was not multiplied, but rather boosted by a constant 
term.  This would result in incessantly continuous reinforcement (Redish 2004). Although it is unclear 
whether a key prediction of this particular account holds (Iordanova et al., 2006; Panlilio et al., 2007; 
Jaffe et al., 2010), model-free RL provides a number of alternatives (Dayan, 2009), which have seen 
important elaborations and modifications (Dezfouli et al., 2009; Piray et al., 2010). 
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A further alternative is that the persistent alteration in postsynaptic D2 receptors could specifically impact 
the learning of NoGo responses (i.e. learning not to emit a response) when less reward than expected is 
provided. This comes from the insight, worked out in impressive detail by Frank and colleagues (Frank 
and O’Reilly, 2006; Cohen and Frank, 2009; Frank, 2005; Frank et al., 2007; Frank and Claus, 2006), that 
D2 receptors on neurons in the indirect pathway of the striatum play a prominent role in detecting pauses 
in the phasic activity of dopamine neuron (i.e., dips below baseline firing). Pauses come from negative 
prediction errors (i.e. when the obtained reward is smaller than expected). Because D2 receptors have an 
inhibitory effect, pauses result in removing inhibition from the indirect pathway in a selective manner. In 
turn, this reduced inhibition allows the indirect pathway functionally to inhibit the actions that led to these 
dips and to facilitate learning not to execute them in the future (Shen et al., 2008). Indeed, recent 
optogenetic interrogation of these circuits has supported a role for the indirect, D2-modulated system, in 
punishment and the associated inhibition (Kravitz et al. 2012). If the D2 system is compromised, then 
subjects might be significantly less able to learn to suppress responses after punishments and avoid doing 
actions that ultimately turn out to be highly deleterious, such as those associated with drug taking 
(Vanderschuren et al., 2005; though see Piasecki et al., 2010).  
Indeed, it is D2 rather than D1 agonists that enhance cocaine seeking and promote relapse (Self et al. 
1996). Moreover, addictive and/or compulsive behaviours are well-described side-effects of D2 agonist 
treatments in Parkinson’s disease (Dagher and Robbins 2009). The involvement of both D2 
downregulation and overstimulation raises questions about the exact mechanism that links D2 
dysregulation with addiction. One explanation might be that D2 downregulation is often observed in 
patients after detoxification, and hence may represent an adaptive consequence of pathologically high 
dopamine levels. A second possibility is a dissociation between pre- and postsynaptic D2 effects. Indeed, 
because presynaptic effects mainly impact phasic dopamine signals, which in turn are sensed by D1 
receptors (Dreyer et al., 2010), this may also map on differences between direct and indirect pathways. 
Third, while continuous stimulation of D2 receptors could prevent the learning contingent on dopamine 
dips, a downregulation of D2 receptors could reduce the specificity with which aversive reinforcement is 
associated with events. This latter process may also involve dysfunctions in orbitofrontal cortex function 
(Takahashi et al., 2011), which are associated with D2 receptor changes in addiction (Volkow et al., 
2007). Finally, synaptic plasticity at D1 receptors may also contribute to addictive behavior (Pascoli et al. 
2012).  
In the following, we focus on two mechanisms that may be of particular importance: predominantly 
instrumental ones to do with neuroadaptations and deep striatal embedding, and a predominantly 
Pavlovian one to do with an enhanced effect of state values on behavior. These effects may be synergistic, 
and may even turn out to depend on related underlying neural substrates. 
Summary box 2: D2 receptors in the striatum play a key role in the development of addiction 
as well as established addiction. One possibility is that they do this by influencing phasic 
dopamine signals. Alternatively, they might specifically impair Nogo-learning after 
punishments or non-rewards and thereby facilitate the persistence of addiction in the face of 
negative consequences.  
Habitization and striatal embedding 
An additional factor that might affect the inability to change behavior when shocks are superimposed is 
the progression mentioned above from goal-directed to habitual behavior, and, thereafter, to a minimal, 
value-independent, actor. As described above, model-based goal-directed behaviors dominate 
performance early in learning, while cached behaviors take over after extensive training.  
The realization of the switch from goal-directed to habitual responding remains unclear, but in healthy 
individuals, prelimbic and infralimbic cortical regions appear to play a significant part (Killcross and 
Coutureau, 2003; Smith et al., 2012). Similar to experience, stress and alcohol are known to promote 
habitual over goal-directed responding and lead to the emergence of the signature outcome-insensitive 
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behavior (c.f. Figure 1b; Schwabe and Wolf, 2009, Ostlund and Balleine 2008). However, whether this 
involves the same mechanisms as in healthy states is unclear. A priori, it could reflect either a strong 
expression of habitual behavior, be driven by a weakening of the goal-directed controller, or represent a 
combination of both. While arguments that stress the influence of drugs of abuse on phasic dopamine 
signals favor the former (e.g. Redish, 2004), other accounts emphasize the latter. Ostlund and Balleine 
(2008), for instance, suggest that the shift from goal-directed to habitual responding observed with 
alcohol really should be seen as a failure by the goal-directed system to reassert its influence rapidly when 
change is evident. Indeed, there is direct experimental evidence that prelimbic cortex activity can 
ameliorate persistent drug seeking (Chen et al. 2013). The third option – a combination of both processes 
– is suggested by the finding that changes in striatal D2 receptor in addiction correlate with changes in 
prefrontal function (Volkow et al., 2001, 2002a; Heinz et al., 2004; Park et al., 2010).  
As discussed above, cached values are insensitive to a sudden change in outcomes, and can only reflect 
the summed past experience by slowly averaging over iterative updates. This is in contrast with goal-
directed evaluations, which reflect novel information much more rapidly (Dickinson and Balleine, 2002; 
Daw et al., 2005; de Wit et al., 2009; Daw et al. 2011). Thus, if drug-taking actions are cached as highly 
appetitive, then they could be relatively less sensitive to the new-found delivery of shocks. However, 
even cached values are not eternally insensitive to the continued presence of aversive outcomes, but are 
amenable to further modification through experience: a drug habit is more robust to experience than the 
standard habits that ease our daily life. Thus, habitual responding as captured by cached values needs to 
be further fortified to turn into a “compulsion”. During the natural course of prolonged learning, habits 
have been found to undergo just such a fortification, whereby the neural instantiation of habits migrates in 
loops. Early on, the correlates of behavior are prominent in ventral striatal areas, while later on after 
extensive training, the correlates of less flexible behavior are detectable in the dorsal striatum (Joel and 
Weiner, 2000; Haber et al., 2000; Yin et al., 2004; Belin et al., 2009). It is once again not clear that this 
process can lead to “compulsivity” with natural reinforcers, although Dayan (2009) describes two 
reinforcement learning algorithms, relying on actor-critic and advantage learning, that may allow for this.  
Various findings suggest that the ventral to dorsal migration is an important process in the development 
of habits, and potentially of deeply engrained addictive behaviors. The shift depends on dopamine (Faure 
et al., 2005). It is reflected by a change in the pattern of dopamine release (ventral, then dorsal; Ito et al. 
2002). Alcohol hastens the establishment of habits in rodents (Dickinson et al., 2002). In primates, 
functional changes progressing from ventral to dorsal striatum have also been observed in response to 
cocaine self-administeration (Porrino et al., 2004). Further, both dopaminergic lesions in the dorsolateral 
striatum (Vanderschuren et al., 2005) and disconnection of ventral to dorsal connectivity abolishes what 
may be a key link in the chain of the development of a “compulsion”, namely drug seeking behavior 
(Belin and Everitt, 2008). However, the relationship of the dorsal migration to D2 receptor abnormalities 
is not yet fully understood. 
Summary box 3: Progressive embedding of habits from ventral to dorsal striatum via 
spiraling loops may provide a substrate for the “compulsive” nature of addictive behaviors.  
Sign tracking 
Ever since the seminal description of opiate addicted soldiers returning from Vietnam (Robins et al., 
1974), environmental cues associated with drug taking have been thought likely to make a powerful and 
potentially perpetual contribution. In the laboratory, these effects can be examined in Pavlovian 
conditioning paradigms, where stimuli (e.g. a light) are presented at unpredictable times, but predict the 
imminent delivery of a reward (say a food pellet or an addictive drug). Responses to drug-associated 
conditioned cues have long been examined in humans and shown strong effect sizes. Patients with a 
variety of drug addictions report more craving and show more physiological responses when seeing drug-
associated cues (Carter and Tiffany, 1999). Furthermore, there is evidence that the prefrontal response to 
passively viewed drug-associated cues is affected by striatal D2 receptors (Heinz et al., 2004), and that 
these responses are predictive of relapse (Grüsser et al., 2004).  
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Theoretical accounts of Pavlovian learning, i.e. of the establishment of such responses, emphasize the 
attribution of a value to a stimulus or situation. This is in contrast to instrumental learning, which 
attributes value to state-action pairs. However, as we mentioned, similar to the instrumental state-action 
case, values of states can be derived by model-based or model-free mechanisms. While the latter are 
thought to relate to iterative, trial-and-error learning via a dopaminergic prediction error, the status of the 
former are less certain, but, if they are shared with instrumental model-based evaluation (as they may do 
only partially; Robinson & Berridge, 2013), they likely involve the prefrontal cortex – the prelimbic 
cortex in rodents and the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex as the human analogue (Schoenbaum et al., 2009; 
Walton et al., 2010; Takahashi et al., 2011).   
As we discussed, in Pavlovian conditioning, subjects may emit a number of different behaviors in  
response to the presence or predictions of the presence of reinforcers (i.e. the value) (Devenport 1979). 
Unlike the instrumental case, the form of the emitted behavior is linked inflexibly (likely via evolutionary 
mechanisms) to the stimulus. The value attributed to the stimulus determines whether the behavior is 
emitted and how strongly. Because the identity of the behavior is linked to the stimulus rather than to the 
achievement of a goal or reception of a reward, these Pavlovian responses are likely adaptive on an 
evolutionary scale, but have the potential of being counter-productive in specific instances (Boakes, 1977; 
Hirsch and Bolles, 1980; Hershberger, 1986; Williams and Williams, 1969; Dayan et al., 2006, Guitart-
Masip et al. 2012). 
Flagel and colleagues have recently examined individual variation in the situation where a light bulb 
predicts a food pellet, but where the light bulb is mounted at a different spatial location to where the food 
is being delivered (Meyer et al., 2012). Some rats, henceforth called ’goal trackers’, come to immediately 
move towards the food pellet delivery site when the light comes on. Others, the ’sign trackers’ instead 
approach the light (the sign; Figure 4A,D). In both groups the light, which has come to predict an 
appetitive event, modified behavior. Only the sign trackers, however, emit the response of approaching 
the predictor. This property of the sign is called incentive salience by Berridge and Robinson (1998).  
 
Figure 4: Sign tracking and goal tracking by rats exposed to classical conditioning, whereby 
a light signal predicts delivery of a food US at a different location. A&D: Sign tracking rats 
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come to approach the light during the delay between US and CS, while goal-tracking rats 
approach the location where the food US will be delivered. B&E: Phasic dopamine signals in 
the nucleus accumbens core. In sign trackers, the phasic response to the CS increases, while 
that to the US decreases, just as predicted by the temporal prediction error hypothesis (Figure 
2B). In Goal trackers, phasic dopamine responses to CS and US do not change over time. 
C&F show how the peak dopamine responses change over trials. These differences suggest 
that sign trackers acquire a cached value V in accordance with the temporal prediction 
hypothesis, but that goal trackers do not.  Data in B,C,E,F adapted from Flagel et al. 2011.  
In sign trackers, dopamine released in the nucleus accumbens core (a key region for Pavlovian effects on 
behavior; Holmes et al. 2010) shows the the characteristic patterns of a temporal difference prediction 
error (Figure 4B,C; see Huys et al., subm. for a detailed discussion): over time, the phasic response to the 
onset of the CS increases, while the phasic dopamine response to the onset of the US decreases. In goal 
trackers, on the other hand, the phasic dopamine signals do not adapt, as if the cached signal was not 
being used to acquire the value of the signal (Figure 4E,F). Thus, the phasic dopaminergic signals only 
resemble the model-free prediction error signals in one group: the sign trackers. Maybe even more 
strikingly, it is also only in the sign trackers that a dopaminergic antagonist abolishes the response to the 
conditioned cue (Flagel et al., 2011). That is, these phasic dopaminergic signals appear only to be critical 
for learning in the sign trackers. Furthermore, animals that sign track to food (unlike goal trackers) have a 
distinctively ’addictive’ neuropsychological profile: they also sign track to cocaine (Flagel et al., 2009), 
are more susceptible to the sensitizing effects of amphetamine (Flagel et al., 2008), and they are more 
novelty seeking (Flagel et al., 2010) and impulsive (Lovic et al., 2011). The boosted dopamine signal is 
reminiscent of the finding discussed earlier whereby reductions in pre-synaptic D2 receptor sensitivities 
boost phasic dopamine signals (Bello et al., 2011). In fact, animals that sign track do show lower D2 
receptor densities in midbrain dopaminergic areas (Flagel et al., 2007). Finally, while sign-tracking and 
goal-tracking sub-populations exist in outbred strains, there is also a genetic influence as these 
phenotypes can be bred true (Flagel et al., 2011).  
Thus, it appears that only one group of subjects, the sign trackers, shows cached Pavlovian conditioning 
maintained by iterative updates via phasic dopaminergic prediction errors; and that those subjects prone 
to employing a cached learning mechanism are more vulnerable to develop addictive behaviors. The 
conditioning observed in the goal trackers could well be a signature of goal-directed behavior, being 
independent of phasic dopaminergic prediction errors (Dickinson et al., 2000; Wassum et al., 2011). In 
the words of the authors, goal-trackers do not assign ’incentive value’ to the predictive stimuli (McClure 
et al., 2003; Huys et al., subm.); a derivation of value via a goal-directed mechanism would predict 
selective sensitivity to outcome devaluation in goal trackers (Allman et al. 2010). We note that the 
addiction vulnerability of subjects who use a cached Pavlovian value to guide action choice might 
possibly be another facet of the shift from model-based, or goal-directed, to model-free, or cached, 
decision making discussed above. Indeed, the fact that sign-trackers do not develop a goal-tracking 
response under DA antagonism suggests that in the absence of iterative caching mechanisms, these 
animals have no alternative backup learning mechanism or are unable to engage it. Given reports of 
parallel representations of habitual and goal-directed responding (Coutureau and Killcross, 2003), this 
points to a parallel impairment in goal-directed function, possibly due to variations in prefrontal function 
(Volkow et al., 2009).   
Robinson and Berridge (2003, 2001) suggest the additional possibility of incentive sensitization – namely 
that the dopamine release associated with drug-associated cues is boosted to abnormal levels by a direct 
physiological adaptation to the drug delivery. This could emphasize those cues, and lead to untoward 
actions under Pavlovian control, even if maladaptive. However, this has to date not been shown in 
humans (Heinz et al., 2004; 2005b; Volkow et al., 1996). 
It is worth noting an additional possible effect of internal states on relapses. Many drugs exert their 
strongest immediate impact after a period of abstinence (rather as food is often more tasty when you are 
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hungry). If the state of abstinence can be internally recognized, then the value of cues associated with 
drugs (i.e., the predicted value of the drugs to which they lead) when ’clean’ could be particularly high, 
and thus particularly hard to resist. In fact, this problem can afflict instrumental mechanisms too. 
Summary box 4: Animals whose phasic dopaminergic signals in the ventral striatum behave 
as if they were involved in acquisition of cached values show addictive traits.  
Conditioned reinforcement 
A final effect that we consider is the possibility suggested by the sign trackers, that vulnerabilities to the 
development of addiction may lie in the extent to which cached values influence behavior. The nucleus 
accumbens core is critical to another aspect of Pavlovian influence on behavior (Parkinson et al., 1999), 
namely second-order conditioning. In this, subjects work not to obtain access to drugs or other direct 
reinforcers themselves (USs), but rather to obtain access to conditioned stimuli (CSs) that have previously 
been associated with the USs. In other words, it describes the process by which neutral CSs can come to 
motivate behavior in a manner akin to USs. Animal experiments showed that CSs predictive of drugs are 
extremely stable and powerful in supporting second-order conditioning, even long after the association 
between the CS and the US has been extinguished (Di Ciano and Everitt, 2004). However, it is again only 
sign trackers that show this behavior (Robinson and Flagel, 2009). If we follow Everitt and Robbins 
(2005) in interpreting drug seeking as conditioned reinforcement, then this suggests that drug seeking 
would preferentially occur amongst subjects whose dopaminergic system builds cached values.  
The mechanisms of second-order conditioning may play an additional role. As we mentioned above, 
when goal-directed search trees become too large to build and search, it is expected that cached values 
will be used to substitute for the evaluation of extensive branches of the tree. For instance, the queen is 
the most powerful figure in chess. Winning without a queen is hard, and manoeuvres that ‘sacrifice’ the 
queen in order to achieve a win are rare and viewed as very elegant. This may be because rather than 
thinking through the consequences of sacrificing the queen, players are dissuaded from sacrificing the 
queen by its cached value, acquired over previous experience (Huys et al., 2012). This substitution of 
subcomponents of the goal-directed decision process by cached values is one possible avenue to second-
order conditioning, but acting between the model-based and model-free systems. The resulting hybrid 
could provide an account for why drugs addicts are on the one hand able to engage in highly complex and 
goal-directed drug seeking, but then entirely fail to consider the outcomes of drug taking: they use 
complex, goal-directed tree search to seek the drug state; but the value of the drug state itself is model-
free. It is therefore not further decomposed and its subcomponents not accessible to the goal-directed 
system. High-level cognition is therefore distorted by the habits but cannot modify or comprehend the 
components making up the value of the habit itself.. By the same token, interrupting the Pavlovian 
attraction to drug related stimuli (e.g. by attention control training; Fadardi and Cox 2009; Wiers et al. 
2011) may interrupt the maintenance or further development of the habit / “compulsion”.  
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Conclusion 
The power of addictive drugs to seize control over the apparatus of decision making in vulnerable 
individuals is awesome and awful in equal measure. It turns out that the key problem to resolve is not so 
much the initiation, but rather the development of the disorder, leading as it does, in a sub-population, to 
“compulsive” behavior that resists being curtailed by the obviously evident negative outcomes. 
The field of neural reinforcement learning is providing a wide range of both quantitative and qualitative 
foundations for encompassing the wealth of data, and providing foundations for some of the 
implementational, algorithmic and computational flaws that might be responsible (Redish, 2004; Redish 
et al., 2008; Dezfouli et al., 2009; Piray et al., 2010; Dayan, 2009; Huys et al., subm). We have discussed 
a number of instrumental and Pavlovian possibilities;  these are discussed in more detail in the references. 
We paid particular attention to model-based and model-free forms of instrumental behaviour along with 
Pavlovian influences. Amongst various distinctions, it is likely that model-free forms of prediction and 
control are largely hidden from explicit subjective view. However, the nature of subjective access to 
model-based prediction and control, and what happens when model-based and model-free systems 
interact (as when values from the latter are used to substitute for branches in the tree-based evaluation of 
the former) are as yet incompletely clear. Conversely, among things that these systems are all expected to 
exploit is the representation of the decision-making domain. Such a representation forms the foundation 
for all predictions, and its own realization poses substantial computational (and statistical) demands. 
Since representations are in common between the systems, we did not discuss them here; however, it is 
recently being recognized that many phenomena in normal and additive decision-making such as 
extinction and spontaneous recovery therefrom may be understood through an analysis of how different 
cases of learning lead to generalizing or specializing representations (Grossberg, Courville, Redish, 
Gershman). 
We focused on dopamine, because it appears critical for the common mode of action of drugs of 
addiction. However, other neuromodulators and neurotransmitters also appear to play critical roles in  
some aspects of the development and maintenance of addictions. For instance, opioids have been 
discussed by Berridge (2009) as being involved in the process of hedonic evaluation of outcomes (and 
thus cues leading to those outcomes). Such hedonic effects may influence learning directly, and could 
also modulate RL mechanism by changing apparent outcome values. This offers an alternative route to 
the sort of incentive salience or even incentive sensitization discussed above (Berridge and Robinson 
(1998); Robinson and Berridge (2003)). For instance, one PET study revealed that µ-opioid receptors are 
up-regulated in detoxified alcohol-dependent patients compared to healthy controls, and that the degree of 
up-regulation directly correlated with alcohol craving. Alcohol intake in such patients may then release 
endorphins and induce increased pleasure. Indeed, opiate antagonists can be used clinically, and some 
patients in the study reported that the desire to consume alcohol during a relapse was reduced when they 
took naltrexone, a drug that blocks opiate receptors including the mu-opiate receptors in the ventral 
striatum (Heinz et al., 2005a, 2009a). 
In addition, there is ample speculation about the role of serotonin as an opponent to dopamine, with 
mechanisms by which both increases and decreases in serotonin concentration can impact the evaluation 
of states and outcomes (Cools et al., 2009; Daw et al., 2002; Dayan and Huys, 2008, 2009; Boureau and 
Dayan, 2011; Cools et al., 2011). There is evidence that serotonin transporters are impaired during 
alcohol detoxification (Heinz et al., 1998), and this could, for instance, interfere with limbic activation to 
threatening stimuli and contribute to negative mood. 
Perhaps the most important immediate direction for the next phase of modeling is to incorporate the 
significant insights available from the extensive data on the effects of neurobiological markers such as D2 
receptor function and vulnerabilities to turning casual drug use into a fully-fledged addiction. This is 
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nicely consonant with recent trends in the research of decision making to embrace the richness and 
complexity of individual differences. 
In sum, together with the models for the initiation of addiction that are well described (Redish, 2004; 
Redish et al., 2008; Dezfouli et al., 2009; Dayan, 2009; Gutkin and Ahmed, 2011), neural RL provides 
many routes to the formalization of the phenomenological experience of initiation, craving, loss of control 
over intake of drugs, habitization of drug taking and even the manifestation of anxiety and arousal during 
withdrawal. Computational accounts of drug addiction started from a simple observation about the 
devastating consequences of ectopically seizing the reigns of the prediction error; however through theory 
and models, this domain of enquiry has evolved to being richly revealing about the overall architecture of 
choice. 
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